The Quad Agreement

Raising awareness of the maritime sector throughout Indopazifik is another means by which four-party cooperation could be a force multiplier for all, especially with regard to submarine defence. This could take the form of access to military surveillance technology (for example, Australia and India now operate the two US P-8 surveillance aircraft), the development of a shared military infrastructure throughout Indopazifik (the Australian military base on the Coco Islands, HMAS Stirling and the Indian bases of Andamans and Nicobaren, the US base at Diego Garcia)[91] and the extension of information exchange agreements. Signed in 2018, the Communications and Security Agreement (COMCASA), signed in 2018, will allow New Delhi to access secure and encrypted defense communications equipment from Washington and exchange real-time data with the United States and allied forces such as Australia and Japan over previously limited communication channels. This will both increase the interoperability of the armed forces of quad countries and improve their combined maritime consciousness. [92] India has signed „white“ (commercial) maritime agreements with a number of countries, including Australia and the United States, which could be extended to „grey“ (military) maritime agreements between the four countries. India and the United States also signed the Logistics Memorandum of Understanding for the Exchange of Goods (LEMOA) in 2016, and Australia and India will sign a logistics agreement in 2020 that will facilitate the mutual use of military facilities to promote energy projection. Similar agreements could be followed between all quad countries. In May 2007, Australian Prime Minister John Howard participated in Manila with other members, at Cheney`s request, in the quadrilateral`s constituent assembly, a month after joint naval exercises by India, Japan and the United States near Tokyo. .

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