The Parties have not implemented the substantial political and institutional reforms set out in Section II of the Agreement (Part I sets out the general principles of the Agreement), starting with regionalisation. So far, the measures have been temporary or too limited to have a real impact on the soil. It took months of negotiations between the signatories and the international partners of the Agreement Monitoring Committee (CFS) to appoint interim authorities in the northern regions, with little tangible results. Three years later, these authorities do not have sufficient financial and human resources and training to effectively manage the regions. The two new regions (Ménaka and Taoudenit), created in northern Mali on the basis of commitments made in 2011 by President Amadou Toumani Touré, also lack resources. Voters in these regions were unable to elect MPs in the April 2020 parliamentary elections because the electoral constituencies were not yet demarcated. Five years after the signing of the agreement, it remains essential to remedy this shortcoming. Without the support of the people of southern Mali, many of its local interest groups will continue to act to freeze the agreement and renegotiate its terms. The renegotiation is neither in the interest of the international community nor of the CMA and could even lead, in time, to a resumption of bellicose discourse. The denunciation of the peace agreement is one of the complaints filed by the organizers of the 5 movement As instability spreads in central Mali and beyond its borders, international actors such as Barkhane (a French anti-terrorist operation in the Sahel) and MINUSMA have increasingly turned their eyes elsewhere, such as Burkina Faso and Niger. In this huge region, the limited armed forces (5,100 Barkhane and 13,000 MINUSMA soldiers) cannot be present everywhere. It is therefore essential for southern painters to further support the process by the political elites and civil society organizations they are supposed to represent. They played no role in the discussions that led to the signing of the agreement in 2015 and many oppose a negotiated text without their contribution.
The 2015 text gave the Malian government the task of providing information and raising public awareness of the content of the agreement, but as the Carter Center found, the government has done little in this regard. There are now more public campaigns protesting against the peace agreement than for that. Awareness-raising initiatives have focused on the population of the North and have ignored the fact that the agreement also applies to southern Mali, notably through the reform of regionalization and the creation of a Senate. . . .