Polaris Dealer Agreement

The applicants argue that Gregory and Kim Johnson did not sign the dealership contract and are therefore not bound by its terms. In addition, they assert that the defendant Polaris Sales is not a signatory to the agreement. Thus, the applicants challenge the viability or existence of a conciliation agreement between the defendant Polaris Sales and all the plaintiffs, as well as between the defendants and Gregory and Kim Johnson. [5] The existence of a written conciliation agreement between the parties is a precondition for the coercing of arbitration at the end of the FAA. [6] 9 U.S.C No. 4 (1999); MCI Telecommunications. Corp. v. Exalon Indus., Inc., 138 F.3d 426, 429-30 (1st Cir.1998); Sleeper Farms, 211 F. Supp. 2d to 200. Therefore, the Tribunal must first consider the benefits of the applicants` unsigned arguments before considering the scope of the concession agreement compromise clause.

In April 2016, the high country plaintiffs High Country, Inc. and the defendant Polaris Sales, Inc. („Polaris“) entered into a dealer agreement („agreement“) in which Polaris High Country („dealer“) authorized the trade of certain Polaris products. [doc. 8-1 to 27]. Polaris is a division of Polaris Industries, Inc., which manufactures a variety of all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), snowmobiles and boats. [doc. 7 to 2]. The Polaris vehicles included in the agreement were Polaris`GEM electric cars, VHT, brutus UTVs and RANGER/RZRs. [doc. 8-1 to 27].

Section 13 (d) of the contract states that „[d] its agreement may be terminated at any time by the distributor by notifying Polaris sixty (60) days after the written termination.“ [doc. 8-1 to 15]. The agreement also contains an arbitration agreement. Section 19 provides in part: [5] Since arbitration clauses are dissociable from the contracts in which they occur, only challenges on the merits of the clause itself or the existence of the major contract constitute arbitration issues for the court. Large v. Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp., 292 F.3d 49, 53 (1. Cir.2002) (edited by prima Paint Corp. v. Flood – Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S.

395, 403-04, 87 P. Ct. 1801, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1270 (1967)); Sleeper Farms v. Agway, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 197, 201 (D.Me.2002). Where it is alleged in the challenge that an agreement no longer exists, but acknowledges that there was an arbitration agreement between the parties on the dispute, the dispute is not a matter of simplicity.

Tall, 292 F.3d to 53-54; A.T. Cross Co. v. Royal Selangor PTE, Ltd., 217 F. Supp. 2d 229, 233 (D.R.I.2002). In this case, the applicants acknowledge the existence of a written arbitration agreement between the signatory parties, but dispute that there was an agreement on the non-signatory parties, in addition to the dedition of the scope of the agreement. The applicants` non-significant arguments are therefore due to the existence of an arbitration agreement. See Sandvik AB v. Advent Int`l Corp., 220 F.3d 99, 106 (3d Cir.2000); Smith/Enron Cogeneration Ltd.

P`ship, Inc. v. Smith Cogeneration Int`l, Inc., 198 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir.1999). Michael Dady is a Minneapolis-based lawyer with Dady-Gardner, P.A., a 10-lawyer law firm in Minneapolis, Minnesota. EMAIL: jmdady@dadygardner.com Jeff Haff is a Minneapolis-based lawyer at Dady and Gardner, P.A. Jeff has represented franchisees and merchants in the United States in litigation and non-judicial matters.

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